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 The Opening Skies Ann M. Florini
 Third-Party Imaging Satellites
 and U.S. Security
 Earth observation sat-
 ellites, long a mainstay of U.S. intelligence-gathering, are now presenting
 new challenges for U.S. national security. The United States and the Soviet
 Union have long since reconciled themselves to being spied on by each other
 from space. Now, however, the advent of imaging satellite systems owned
 and operated by a variety of third parties, including governments other than
 the superpowers (France, Canada, the European Space Agency, India, and
 China) and private companies, is raising new concerns for U.S. peacetime
 foreign relations and military activities, and for crisis management and war-
 time operations. These new satellites, primarily civilian remote-sensing in-
 struments, are intended to gather information on subjects ranging from
 agriculture to urban planning, but they can also observe scenes of military
 interest, and their data are publicly available. They have already been used
 to reveal new information about Soviet military facilities on the Kola penin-
 sula and to publicize deployments in the Iran-Iraq war.
 Attention has centered on the potential media uses of remote-sensing
 satellites (unsurprisingly, issues focusing on the media often garner substan-
 tial media attention).1 But the issues raised by the loss of the superpowers'
 monopoly go far beyond the potential conflict between national security and
 First Amendment rights to gather and disseminate information. The prospect
 of using these systems for independent verification of multilateral arms con-
 trol accords is already attracting growing interest among Europeans and
 The author would like to thank Nancy Lubin, Tomas Ries and Thomas Risse-Kappen for helpful
 comments on earlier versions of this paper.
 Ann Florini is Studies Coordinator at the Center for International and Strategic Affairs, University of
 California, Los Angeles, where she specializes in arms control, space policy, and South Asian security
 issues.
 1. Much of the attention to the prospective media uses of space has been sparked by the efforts
 of the Radio-Television News Directors Association, Media in Space Committee, chaired by
 Mark Brender of ABC News. For an overview, see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assess-
 ment (OTA), Commercial Newsgathering From Space-A Technical Memorandum, OTA-TM-ISC-40
 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S.G.P.O], May 1987). Further infor-
 mation on media interest is available from Mark Brender, ABC News, 1717 DeSales Street N.W.,
 Washington, D.C. 20036.
 International Security, Fall 1988 (Vol. 13, No.'2)
 X 1988 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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 others. Pentagon officials, concerned that previously-restricted detailed in-
 formation on military facilities is becoming widely available, have requested
 a review of the security aspects of these systems.2
 Two concerns must be kept in mind: that other nations may choose to
 develop dedicated military systems (possibly by drawing on technology orig-
 inally developed for civilian purposes); and that the systems developed for
 civilian purposes may incidentally gather information of national security
 value.3 Questions prompted by civilian systems parallel those of nuclear
 nonproliferation policy-civil facilities could be used as cover for military
 programs, and perfectly legitimate civil programs might provide a govern-
 ment with a latent military capability. Either way, the proliferation of satellite
 imaging systems raises issues that range across the spectrum of national
 security matters.
 Threats to the security of sensitive military operations (such as invasions
 or hostage rescue missions) are obvious, and a number of other concerns
 must also be addressed. Will the flood of newly available information restrict
 the government's flexibility during negotiations or times of crisis? Will an
 independent West European reconnaissance capability drive a wedge be-
 tween the NATO allies and the United States? Does the difficulty of inter-
 preting satellite imagery raise dangers of misinterpretation or deliberate dis-
 information? With the spread of both satellite capabilities and advanced
 weaponry of all types, will we see the emergence of a variety of regional
 arms control agreements that exclude the superpowers? Will the media be
 able to verify-or counter-U.S. government allegations of Soviet activities
 in the Third World, such as a charge that missiles have been placed in
 Nicaragua?
 This paper provides a preliminary guide to the issues raised by the spread
 of military and civilian satellite imagery. It briefly outlines the existing and
 planned satellite systems; analyzes what they can see; discusses the impli-
 cations of this new information source for U.S. national security in peacetime,
 crisis, and war; and proposes a series of policy options. Given the rapid pace
 2. Aviation Week and Space Technology, February 16, 1987, p. 15. The study was requested by the
 Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Craig Alderman, Jr., and was carried out by the
 National Security Operations Advisory Committee.
 3. Imaging satellites are only one means of gathering information from space. Another crucial
 one is electronic intelligence (ELINT). However, ELINT has no civilian role, and there is thus
 no economic incentive to acquire ELINT capabilities. The planned French military reconnaissance
 satellites will have some ELINT capability, but in general, the civilian imaging satellites are of
 far more immediate national security concern.
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 of both technological developments and the need to devise a coherent policy
 in this field, a serious discussion of these issues is already overdue.
 Capabilities
 An analysis of the security implications of the new third-party systems re-
 quires an understanding of their existing and likely future capabilities-i.e.,
 what the various operators will be able to see. The impact of the deployment
 of these various systems depends entirely on the technical characteristics of
 the specific system: different types of satellites can see very different things.
 All satellite-based remote-sensing systems detect electromagnetic radiation
 (such as visible light) that is reflected or emitted by objects on Earth ema-
 nating through the atmosphere in the microwave, visible, and some infrared
 wavelengths. These sensors are generally placed on satellites that travel in
 north-south orbits over the poles, so they will see all points of the globe as
 the Earth rotates beneath them.4
 There are three basic types of sensor: film, electro-optical, and radar. Film
 can provide pictures that show fine detail, but to do so requires a large lens
 that is extremely heavy, and thus expensive, to launch. Initially, the only
 way to see a satellite's pictures was to retrieve the film, either from ejected
 film capsules or by retrieving the entire satellite. In the early 1960s, the U.S.
 Satellite and Missile Observation Systems (SAMOS) reconnaissance satellites
 began developing the film on board the satellite and transmitting the image
 electronically back to Earth, a much faster process, but one that resulted in
 much lower image quality.5 In either case, the satellite became useless once
 it ran out of film. Many of these problems have been largely resolved with
 a different and rapidly improving electro-optical technology used by most
 civilian satellites and the newer military ones. The new technology relies on
 a grid of thousands of tiny light-sensitive sensors called pixels (picture ele-
 ments), each of which independently measures electromagnetic radiation
 from a corresponding area on the ground below. This information is assigned
 a digital value and is almost instantly transmitted to a ground station, where
 4. For an excellent overview of types of military satellites and their orbits, see Ashton B. Carter,
 "Satellites and Anti-Satellites: The Limits of the Possible," International Security, Vol. 10, No. 4
 (Spring 1986), pp. 46-98.
 5. Jeffrey T. Richelson, United States Strategic Reconnaissance: PhotographinglImaging Satellites, ACIS
 Working Paper No. 38 (University of -California at Los Angeles: Center for International and
 Strategic Affairs, 1983), p. 7.
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 the image is reconstructed. This eliminates the need for ejection of film
 capsules, and the speed of transmission enables operators to observe scenes
 virtually in real time. Moreover, the quality of the digital imagery is ap-
 proaching that available from film.6
 RESOLUTION
 Perhaps the most misunderstood concept in satellite imagery is that of spatial
 resolution or ground resolution, referring to the size of the objects on the
 ground that a sensor can distinguish. The easiest way to define resolution is
 as the minimum distance between two white spots on a black background
 at which the sensor can distinguish the two white dots. But for electro-optical
 sensors, resolution is often defined in a very different way, as the area on
 the ground that a single pixel sees at any given instant (its "Instantaneous
 Field of View," or IFOV). Each pixel only gives a reading of predominant
 electromagnetic radiation in its IFOV in whatever spectral band the sensor
 detects, and can detect nothing smaller than its IFOV (although it is possible
 to detect thinner objects, if they are longer; for example, satellites are good
 at seeing roads). As a rough rule of thumb, it generally requires at least two-
 and-a-half pixels to distinguish an object. Thus, while a sensor with ten-
 meter resolution by the white-dot definition can actually distinguish objects
 as small as about ten meters, a sensor with ten-meter resolution by the IFOV
 definition can only detect objects above about twenty-five meters in size. The
 word "resolution" is often bandied about with no clear indication as to which
 definition is being used. This paper uses the pixel-size IFOV definition,
 unless otherwise indicated.
 In fact, ground resolution also depends on such additional factors as at-
 mospheric conditions, the sensor's "noise," camera shake, and the amount
 of contrast in the scene being observed. For example, a sensor on the U.S.
 civilian Landsat satellite with a pixel resolution of about 80 meters has de-
 tected 14-meter objects with sharp linear contrast. The presence of shadows
 also facilitates detection and identification.
 Another crucial factor, and a key difference between civilian and military
 imaging systems, is the altitude of the satellite's orbit. Unsurprisingly, the
 closer to the ground a sensor is, the better the ground resolution; high-
 resolution military satellites tend to travel in low orbits for that reason.
 However, low orbits also mean narrow breadth of vision, or "swath width."
 6. For a good discussion of relevant technologies, see Kosta Tsipis, "Arms Control Pacts Can
 Be Verified," Discover, Vol. 8, No. 4 (April 1987), pp. 79-93.
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 Most civilian purposes require a broad, panoramic view, which is only pos-
 sible from higher altitudes.7 Military reconnaissance satellites thus orbit at
 anywhere from 200 to 500 kilometers above the Earth's surface, while civilian
 observation satellites are found at 500-1000 kilometer orbits. It has been
 noted that the sensors of the U.S. civilian Landsat could already attain a
 resolution of less than six meters if they were moved from Landsat orbits of
 700-900 kilometers to the lower orbits (200 kilometers) of military reconnais-
 sance satellites.8 If the French civilian SPOT (Systeme pour l'observation de la
 Terre) satellite were to orbit at 200 kilometers, one of its sensors which now
 has ten-meter resolution would attain three-meter resolution.9
 "Resolution" is thus a very fuzzy term. At best, it can provide only a
 general idea of what information may be available from a particular satellite
 system. As a rough guide, resolution of no better than twenty meters is
 useful primarily for natural resources analysis and other economic purposes
 (although large structures such as roads, ports, runways, and large ships
 can be detected at twenty to thirty meters); resolution of one to ten meters
 is useful for military reconnaissance; and resolution of better than one meter
 is needed for precise description and technical analysis of military hard-
 ware. 10
 Resolution based on a sensor's ability to detect objects of various sizes is
 called spatial resolution. A second and equally important type, called spectral
 resolution, refers to the particular wavelength of the electromagnetic spectrum
 that a sensor can detect. Not all wavelengths can pass through the atmo-
 sphere. Those that can include:
 -roughly 0.4 to 1.0 micrometers (millionths of a meter), encompassing
 reflected visible (such as blue, green and red) and near-infrared light;
 7. There are two types of satellite reconnaissance: area surveillance and "close look". Area
 surveillance from relatively high orbits is used to look broadly over large swaths of territory for
 a first glimpse of anything of interest. Close look satellites use the lowest orbits to achieve the
 highest resolution for detailed reconnaissance. The U.S. military relies on Landsat and SPOT as
 well as its own satellites for area surveillance.
 8. Bruce G. Blair, "Reconnaissance Satellites," in Bhupendra Jasani, ed., Outer Space: A New
 Dimension of the Arms Race (London: Taylor and Francis, Stockholm International Peace Research
 Institute [SIPRI], 1982), pp. 128-129.
 9. Torleiv Orhaug, "Technology requirements for a satellite monitoring agency focused on
 Europe," in Bhupendra Jasani and Toshibomi Sakata, eds., Satellites for Arms Control and Crisis
 Monitoring (New York: Oxford University Press and SIPRI, 1987), p. 91.
 10. The practical limit on achievable resolution for a satellite-based sensor is a matter of some
 dispute, but is probably roughly ten to thirty centimeters. After that point, atmospheric irreg-
 ularities become a problem. There are various sophisticated techniques, such as use of flexible
 lenses or very fast computers, that could compensate for these irregularities, and efforts are
 reportedly underway to apply these techniques to U.S. reconnaissance satellites.
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 -thermal infrared at about 8-14 micrometers, revealing emitted heat; and
 -microwave, used for radar (radio detecting and ranging) at wavelengths
 from one millimeter to over a meter.11
 By using several visible or near-infrared spectral bands separately to ob-
 serve the same scene, a satellite operator can glean more information than
 would be available with even the finest black-and-white spatial resolution,
 because the chemical properties of various substances cause them to look
 different in different spectral bands. For example, the green spectral band
 cannot distinguish between real vegetation and green-painted camouflage,
 but false-color imagery using the near-infrared band can. In the thermal
 infrared band, an operator can measure heat differences between under-
 ground objects and the surrounding earth to detect buried objects. However,
 the use of additional spectral bands also multiplies the amount of data to be
 processed, an expensive proposition.
 Because of the amount of data generated, there is a tradeoff between the
 fineness of a system's spatial resolution and the number of spectral channels.
 To date, all military satellites have used black-and-white imagery, while
 civilian satellites, which do not need such good spatial resolution, generally
 use several spectral bands. This may be changing, as the military has begun
 to recognize the value of using a variety of spectral bands.12 For example, it
 is possible to use a computer to merge the data acquired from a relatively
 high-resolution black-and-white sensor with the lower resolution of a multi-
 spectral sensor to discern more information, as the Defense Department did
 in the 1987 edition of Soviet Military Power. Page 115 shows an image of the
 Chernobyl reactor acquired from both the SPOT high-resolution black-and-
 white sensor and from Landsat multispectral imagery.
 RADAR
 The visible bands require daylight, and, like the thermal bands, depend on
 relatively cloud-free skies, a rarity in many parts of the world. In contrast,
 radars, which use the microwave part of the spectrum, can provide all-
 weather imagery at all hours of the day and night. Unlike sensors that
 passively observe visible-light and infrared radiation, which are blocked by
 cloud cover and largely unavailable at night, radar sensors actively emit
 11. For a good summary of the uses -of the different spectral bands, see Richelson, Strategic
 Reconnaissance, pp. 2-3.
 12. William Broad, "U.S. is Designing Spy Satellites To Be Far More Secret Than Ever," New
 York Times, November 3, 1987, p. Cl.
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 microwave pulses that can penetrate clouds and work at any hour. Although
 this type of radar system produces enormous quantities of data, advances in
 data-processing techniques have made such systems increasingly feasible.
 The U.S. has operated two space-based radar systems (the Seasat satellite in
 the late 1970s and Shuttle-based radar in the 1980s), and the Department of
 Defense is reportedly putting into operation a new imaging-radar reconnais-
 sance satellite, with the primtary objective of detecting and tracking Warsaw
 Pact armor in cloudy Eastern Europe.13
 The resolution of radar systems is subject to considerable variability, even
 more so than photographic or electro-optical systems. Radar can easily detect
 small objects if they are highly conductive, such as wires, but also can easily
 be spoofed if the target is covered with a conductive material such as chicken-
 wire screening. Radar data is also expensive to transmit and process, and
 radar requires a great deal of power-usually provided by a nuclear reactor.
 Nonetheless, the wave of the future for many civilian and military satellites
 lies with radar: the United States, China, Canada, and the European Space
 Agency are all planning civilian or military radar satellites, and the Soviet
 Union has long operated them.
 USING SATELLITE IMAGERY
 Table 1 shows the ground resolution needed to detect various objects. These
 data have appeared in somewhat different versions in a wide variety of
 publications on reconnaissance and remote sensing,14 and similar information
 appears in a number of military handbooks and reference manuals. Although
 the original sources for the numbers are unknown, the accuracy of these data
 has been borne out by other analyses. For example, a group of Japanese
 experts digitized aerial photos to simulate various satellite resolutions. They
 found that five-meter resolution was required to detect aircraft on the ground
 (4.6 meters in Table 1) and that better than two-meter resolution was needed
 to identify the types of aircraft (1-1.5 meters in Table 1).25 However, given
 13. Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 8, 1987, p. 13.
 14. In addition to the sources cited, versions of the chart have appeared in several SIPRI
 publications edited by Bhupendra Jasani; in a United Nations report, "The Implications of
 Establishing an International Satellite Monitoring Agency," A/AC.206.14 (New York: United
 Nations, 1983); and in Nicholas L. Johnson, Soviet Military Strategy in Space (New York and
 London: Jane's, 1987). p. 58.
 15. Tatsuro Matsumae, et al., "Technological requirements of a satellite monitoring system," in
 Jasani and Sakata, Satellites for Arms Control, pp. 62-75. Other experts familiar with satellite
 imagery say that DC-9-type aircraft can be detected, though not identified, at 10-meter resolu-
 tion.
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 Table 1. Ground Resolution
 General Precise Tech.
 Targeta Detect'nb IDC IDd Descr'n' Analysisf
 Bridges 6 4.5 1.5 1 0.3
 Communications
 Radar 3 1 0.3 0.15 0.015
 Radio 3 1.5 0.3 0.15 0.015
 Supply Dumps 1.5-3 0.6 0.3 0.03 0.03
 Troop Units (in bivouac or on road) 6 2 1.2 0.3 0.15
 Airfield Facilities 6 4.5 3 0.3 0.15
 Rockets and Artillery 1 0.6 0.15 0.05 0.045
 Aircraft 4.5 1.5 1 0.15 0.045
 Command and
 Control Headquarters 3 1.5 1 0.15 0.09
 Missile Sites (SSM/SAM) 3 1.5 0.6 0.3 0.045
 Surface Ships 7.5-15 4.5 0.6 0.3 0.045
 Nuclear Weapons
 Components 2.5 1.5 0.3 0.03 0.015
 Vehicles 1.5 0.6 0.3 0.06 0.045
 Land Minefields 3-9 6 1 0.03 0.09
 Ports and Harbors 30 15 6 3 0.3
 Coasts, Landing Beaches 15-30 4.5 3 1.5 0.15
 Railroad Yards & Shops 15-30 15 6 1.5 0.4
 Roads 6-9 6 1.8 0.6 0.4
 Urban Areas 60 30 3 3 0.75
 Terrain 90 4.5 1.5 0.75
 Surfaced Submarines 7.5-30 4.5-6 1.5 1 0.03
 a. Chart indicates minimum resolution in meters at which target can be detected, identified,
 described, or analyzed. No source specifies which definition of resolution (pixel-size or
 white-dot) is used, but the chart is internally consistent.
 b. Detection: Location of a class of units, object, or activity of military interest.
 c. General Identification: Determination of general target type.
 d. Precise Identification: Discrimination within target type of known types.
 e. Description: Size/dimension, configuration/layout, components construction, equipment
 count, etc.
 f. Technical analysis: Detailed analysis of specific equipment.
 Sources: Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, NASA Authoriza-
 tion for Fiscal Year 1978, pp. 1642-1643, and Reconnaissance Hand Book (McDonnell-
 Douglas Corporation, 1982), p. 125.
 the vagaries inherent in the concept of resolution, the only way to be sure
 what various satellites can see is to examine their imagery.
 A number of analysts have begun to do just that. A recent report from the
 Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) used Landsat imagery to
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 pinpoint and describe Soviet military facilities on the Kola peninsula.16 Land-
 sat imagery is not the highest-resolution imagery now available, but the
 analysts were able to confirm a number of reports in the open literature on
 Soviet facilities, and to provide new information. The satellite imagery re-
 vealed: extensive prepositioning of stocks for fighter aircraft, including Hard-
 ened Aircraft Shelters (HAS); reconstruction of a major weapons depot
 (which had been destroyed by fire in 1984) for the Soviet Northern Fleet's
 surface-to-air (SAM) and surface-to-surface missiles; changes in the numbers
 and positions of ships in the Murmansk fjord; details of the large Gremikha
 naval base, including piers, smaller quays, and buildings; runways and air-
 craft shelters of various sizes, providing clues to the types of planes based
 at various airfields; construction of a previously unreported airfield; and
 hydro-electric plants. This study was conducted by a civilian security analyst
 with extensive knowledge of the Kola peninsula but no training in photo-
 interpretation, and by a geoscientist who has worked with civilian remote
 sensing for such purposes as mapping geological structures; it did not make
 use of the higher-resolution SPOT imagery, for cost reasons. The study clearly
 demonstrates that widely available imagery can be combined with widely
 available expertise both to verify information in the open literature and to
 add new information.
 COLLATERAL INFORMATION
 Despite all these varied capabilities, no satellite system can garner sufficient
 information on its own to be of great use for either civilian or military
 purposes. In virtually all cases, collateral information from the ground is
 needed to tell the operators where the satellites should look, and to guide
 the interpretation of the imagery. The amount of data available from satellites
 would otherwise simply overwhelm the processing and interpretation capa-
 bilities of their operators. For example, most of the images from the most
 sophisticated sensor on the U.S. Landsat satellite have never been fully
 processed, because the sensor generates an overwhelming quantity of data.
 The Landsat operator was able to obtain early images of the Chernobyl
 nuclear disaster only because the radiation detected by Europeans alerted
 the world to the event, the location of the reactor was known, the Landsat
 16. Tomas Ries and Johnny Skorve, "Investigating Kola: A Study of Military Bases Using Satellite
 Photography," (London: Brassey's and the Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt [NUPI], 1987).
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 V satellite then happened to be in an appropriate position, and the operator
 was willing to suspend all other work.17 Military analysts routinely rely on
 such collateral information as data on the military system, geology, and
 meteorology of the target country and timely information on when to cover
 given areas, for example during a crisis or military exercises.
 Current Satellite and Planned Programs
 Within a decade a plethora of nations, plus the European Space Agency, will
 be orbiting Earth-observation satellites.18 Civilian remote sensing has already
 been carried out with a wide variety of imaging sensors on board Landsat,
 SPOT, the Space Shuttle, Skylab, and the Soviet Salyut and Mir space sta-
 tions, as well as Soviet natural resources satellites. The capabilities of the key
 existing and planned systems are described below.
 THE UNITED STATES
 The first civilian land remote-sensing satellite, Landsat 1, was launched by
 NASA in 1972. The current version, Landsat 5, launched in 1984, has a
 number of sensors, the best of which has a twenty-eight-meter resolution
 capability.19 It is an open secret that Landsat's capabilities and operations
 have been deliberately restricted over the years to ensure that they would
 not reveal information damaging to U.S. national security. President Carter's
 Presidential Directive 37, issued in June 1978, reportedly limits the resolution
 of U.S. civilian remote-sensing satellites to no better than ten meters.20 Even
 thus restricted, Landsat has demonstrated the ability to reveal militarily
 significant information, as described in the previous section.
 17. OTA, Commercial Newsgathering From Space, p. 18.
 18. Information on Soviet and U.S. military photo-reconnaissance satellites is ostensibly highly
 classified, but a number of sources in the open literature purport to provide detailed information
 on these programs. See, for example, William Burrows, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National
 Security (New York: Random House, 1986); Carter, "Satellites and Anti-Satellites"; Johnson,
 Soviet Military, as well as his annual The Soviet Year in Space (Colorado Springs, Colorado:
 Teledyne Brown Engineering); Richelson, Strategic Reconnaissance; and a number of journals,
 particularly Aviation Week and Space Technology.
 19. The sensors include a Thematic Mapper with 28-meter resolution in six visible and near-
 infrared spectral bands, and 120-meter resolution in the thermal infrared. Ray J. Arnold and
 William P. Bishop, "An Overview of International Earth Observing Satellite Systems," presen-
 tation to the Twentieth International Symposium on Remote-Sensing of the Environment, Nai-
 robi, Kenya, December 10, 1986, p. 4.
 20. Patricia Humphlett, "Mediasat: The Use of Remote-Sensing Satellites by News Agencies,"
 87-70 SPR (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, January 28, 1987).
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 Recently, however, the U.S. government policy limiting satellite resolution
 has changed. Recognizing that imagery of better than ten-meter resolution
 is already available from the Soviets and will soon be available from the
 French, the U.S. government announced in January 1988 that there would
 be no limits on the resolution that U.S. satellites would be allowed to achieve.
 The move was welcomed by Landsat's commercial operator, the Earth Ob-
 servation Satellite Corporation (Eosat), which is eager to provide five-meter
 resolution to the media and others if a sufficient market develops.21 None-
 theless, the Landsat Commercialization Act of 1984, empowering the secre-
 taries of state and defense to decide whether any given satellite system
 should be granted a license to be launched and operated, remains in effect.
 The U.S. military relies on Landsat data to provide broad area-surveillance
 images and to help locate military targets. The director of the Defense Map-
 ping Agency has stated that, due to the tribulations of U.S. launching systems
 over the past two years and the resulting shortages of military reconnaissance
 satellites, the Agency has grown increasingly dependent on Landsat and the
 French SPOT system to provide data ordinarily available from military sat-
 ellites.22 However, the Landsat system is now in serious trouble, allowing
 other countries to take the lead in a technology pioneered by the United
 States.
 Landsat was operated by NASA and then by the National Oceanic and
 Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) during its first thirteen years. In Oc-
 tober 1985, as part of the Reagan administration's push to involve the private
 sector in space operations, the U.S. government transferred ownership of
 the Landsat system to Eosat (a joint venture of RCA Corporation and Hughes
 Aircraft Company), agreeing to pay a subsidy of about $250 million over five
 years to give Eosat an opportunity to build a commercial market for remote-
 sensing data.23 In return, Eosat agreed to continue operation of Landsats 4
 and 5, and to build two new satellites, Landsats 6 and 7, with considerably
 21. ABC Evening News, January 19, 1988.
 22. Bruce G. Blair and Garry D. Brewer, Verifying Salt Agreements, ACIS Working Paper No. 19
 (University of California at Los Angeles: Center for International and Strategic Affairs, 1980), p.
 15; testimony of Donald Latham before the U.S. Congress, Subcommittee on Natural Resources,
 Agriculture, Research, and the Environment and the Subcommittee on International Scientific
 Cooperation, House Committee on Science, Space and Technology, March 31, 1987; "Space role
 grows in offensive planning," Military Space, July 6, 1987, pp. 1-3.
 23. "Landsat Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984," Report 98-674, House Committee
 on Science and Technology, April 3, 1984, 98th Congress, 2nd session.
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 enhanced capabilities that would include a sensor with fifteen-meter pan-
 chromatic (black-and-white) resolution.
 Such was the 1985 agreement; implementation has followed a much rockier
 path. The Eosat subsidy was deleted from the fiscal year 1988 budget, and
 Eosat stopped work on the Landsats. After considerable political jockeying,
 in March 1988 Congress restored enough funding to start construction of
 Landsat 6, with a planned launch date of 1991.24 Congress also provided
 funds for a study of the commercial prospects for Landsat 7, but none to
 start work on the satellite itself.
 In the meantime, both Landsat 4, only partly operational, and Landsat 5
 have already outlasted their expected three-year lifetime. They could fail at
 any moment, and probably will fail before Landsat 6 is ready. This will leave
 the U.S. at least temporarily with no contender in the civilian remote-sensing
 satellite arena, and dependent on foreign sources for much of the area-
 surveillance information essential to U.S. national security.
 FRANCE
 Meanwhile, the French have entered the commercial remote-sensing com-
 petition in a big way. The first of the SPOT satellites went into orbit in
 February, 1986, on an Ariane launcher, and a second is ready to be launched.
 It now appears that SPOT will last at least a year beyond its two-year design
 lifetime. At least two more SPOTs will be launched sometime in the 1990s,
 and the French have an option on a fifth.25 SPOT l's High Resolution Visible
 Range (HRV) Instruments have a multi-spectral resolution of twenty meters,
 and a black-and-white resolution of ten meters-a substantial improvement
 in spatial resolution over the current Landsat capability, but a far more limited
 spectral resolution.
 SPOT Image Corporation has stated that it intends to pursue the same
 open skies and equal access policies that the United States has followed with
 Landsat, but without the restrictions on resolution capabilities. SPOT rep-
 resentatives insist that there are no tacit understandings with the U.S., the
 French, or any other government, that restrict gathering or dissemination of
 data about military or other matters. Any limits or improvements on SPOT
 capabilities will depend on commercial demand for the imagery, they claim.26
 24. "Senate panel OKs funds for spacecraft," Washington Times, April 1, 1988, p. 2.
 25. "Spotlight" (SPOT Image Corporation), Vol. 1, No. 4 (n.d.), p. 2.
 26. Author's conversations with SPOT officials.
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 Such statements have provoked some skepticism. Unsubstantiated reports
 persist that SPOT l's spatial resolution is actually closer to five meters than
 to the declared ten, and that France is already using SPOT for military
 reconnaissance. It is notable that, to date, the only SPOT images that have
 shown up on the television evening news are those of Soviet military facili-
 ties, and that requests for imagery of France have met with indefinite delays.
 It is at least open to question whether France would actually allow SPOT to
 reveal information damaging to U.S. national security, or to its own. The
 military version of SPOT, Helios (see below), will of course operate in a
 classified manner. SPOT 4 (and 5, if it is approved) will have considerably
 better capabilities than current SPOT satellites.27
 SPOT imagery is readily available, and is being widely used to observe
 military scenes. The March 2, 1987, issue of Aviation Week and Space Technology
 had as its cover illustration a SPOT-generated image of the headquarters of
 the Soviet northern fleet at Severomorsk. On April 2, 1987, ABC Evening
 News broadcast images of the controversial Soviet Krasnoyarsk radar, with
 analyst Peter Zimmerman on hand to explain the significance of the radar's
 location and configuration. Sweden owns six percent of SPOT; its Space
 Media Network is filling orders for rush copies of SPOT images at about
 $3000 each. According to Business Week, a private group has ordered SPOT
 images of Lebanon's Bekaa Valley to look for new Syrian fortifications, and
 a British newspaper has received SPOT pictures of Israel's nuclear facility at
 Dimona.28
 France also plans to use the SPOT technology as the basis for a military
 reconnaissance satellite known as Helios, to be launched in 1992. France had
 attempted to interest the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in an earlier
 version called SAMRO (Satellite Militaire de Reconnaissance Optique).29 That
 effort failed, reportedly because the FRG wanted instead to develop an all-
 weather radar satellite (although discussions on a radar satellite could re-
 sume).30 It now appears that other Europeans will share in the estimated
 27. The new instruments will also include a new vegetation radiometer with five spectral bands
 and the addition of a medium-infrared band to SPOT's high-resolution instrument. "France
 Prepares to Develop Next-Generation Spot 4/5," Aviation Week and Space Technology, October 20,
 1986, p. 103.
 28. "Now You Can Buy Your Own Spy-Satellite Pictures," Business Week, January 26, 1987, p.
 91.
 29. Frederick Doyle, "The utility of civil remote sensing satellites for arms control monitoring,"
 in Jasani and Sakata, Satellites for Arms Control, p. 53.
 30. "O.K. for two French satellite programs," International Defense Review, Vol. 20, No. 3 (March
 1987), p. 268.
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 $1.3 billion cost of Helios: Italy will take on a 15 percent share, working in
 the ground receiving/processing segment, and Spain will pay five percent.
 Both will thus have at least some access to the data.31 The French National
 Assembly Defense Committee has stated that Helios optics will provide a
 resolution of one meter, and near-real time imagery. One-meter resolution
 is comparable to the early U.S. Discoverer satellites that exploded the "missile
 gap" myth in the early 1960s.32 Helios will include both infrared and visible-
 light sensors, as well as an electronic intelligence (ELINT) capability, and will
 be used to develop better penetration aids and guidance systems for the
 independent French nuclear arsenal.
 THE SOVIET UNION
 One substantial question is how the Soviet Union is likely to react to increases
 in availability of satellite observation data. After all, the images of military
 facilities that have been published to date have all shown Soviet, not Amer-
 ican, facilities. The Soviets have not publicly objected, but it is reasonable to
 assume that the Soviet military is not happy about the publicity. The USSR
 tacitly accepted U.S. satellite reconnaissance in the 1960s in part because the
 United States refrained from publishing the information, and thus saved face
 for the Soviets. Soviet authorities have in the past argued that governments
 are responsible for the dissemination of satellite imagery, even that gathered
 by private companies (a notion the United States has said it finds unaccept-
 able). The Soviets have long made a point of relating this responsibility to
 Point IV of the United Nations' legal principles on remote sensing, which
 states that remote sensing "must not be carried out to the detriment of the
 legitimate rights and interests of the sensed state."33
 31. "French Milspace," Military Space, April 27, 1987, p. 8.
 32. At that time U.S. Air Force Intelligence was estimating that the Soviet Union had an
 overwhelming advantage in ICBMs, having a total of 500 or more; this, it was argued, required
 the U.S. to build up in kind. The fact that U-2 reconnaissance flights were seeing no evidence
 of this was attributed to the small footprint of the plane's reconnaissance equipment and to the
 frequent cloud cover that obscured view. By early 1960, however, thousands of Discoverer
 photos with one-meter resolution had been taken over vast tracts of Soviet territory, with few
 signs of the big Soviet SS-6. Discoverer revealed that the Soviet Union had only a handful of
 ICBMs. See Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), pp.
 286-289.
 33. V.V. Vereshchetin and V.M. Postyshev, "International Responsibility of States for Activity
 in Remote Sensing of Earth from Space," Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo, May 1986, pp. 103-108;
 see also United Nations General Assembly, "Principles relating to remote sensing of the Earth
 from Space," Resolution A/RES/41/65, January 22, 1987.
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 The Soviet civilian remote-sensing program, has, however, recently under-
 gone two major shifts. First, the Soviets broke a longstanding pattern of
 limiting dissemination of data from their remote-sensing satellites to just the
 Soviet bloc.34 In July 1987, they announced that they would sell images of
 any site in any non-socialist country, with resolution as good as five meters.
 These will be photographic film images only, even though the Soviets do
 have electro-optical and radar systems available; delivery of imagery will take
 anywhere from a few days to several months after the request is made. This
 new policy appears to reflect a larger Soviet effort to earn hard currency from
 the USSR's increasingly impressive space capabilities. The Soviets insist that
 their program is intended entirely for civilian purposes, but no restrictions
 will be placed on the coordinates for which a customer may request and
 receive imagery, as long as the site is not in a socialist country. In other
 words, while a request specifically asking for imagery of the U.S. military
 launching facility at Vandenberg Air Force Base might be turned down, a
 request that specifies the coordinates where Vandenberg happens to be lo-
 cated might well be honored.
 The Soviet imagery is quite good, and apparently is a matter of some pride.
 In an Isvestia interview in July, the chief of the USSR Council of Ministers'
 Administration for Geodesy and Cartography claimed that Soviet imagery
 can discern the lifeboats on a steamship, and that "one Syrian representative
 managed to find his house on a photograph of Damascus."35 This claim is
 believable. On a five-meter resolution photograph of Amsterdam given to
 the author by the Soviet marketing company Soyuzkharta, canals, major
 streets, and a number of individual buildings can easily be discerned with
 the unaided eye. On the other hand, because these are photographic and
 not electro-optical systems, users must wait for the film to be returned to
 Earth, processed, and distributed, a process that can take months. Even for
 imagery that is already available from the inventory, Soyuzkharta only prom-
 ises delivery within four months. Thus, the Soviet imagery will be useful to
 analyze changes over periods of time or to examine installations in place,
 but not to cover breaking events.
 34. Information on the Soviet civilian remote-sensing program is from sessions of the Space
 Future Forum sponsored by the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Moscow, October 2-4, 1987, and
 from an interview with officials at Soyuzkharta, the enterprise recently established to sell Soviet
 imagery, October 5, 1987, Moscow.
 35. "Space Imagery," Military Space, July 20, 1987, p. 5.
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 In another major step, on July 25, 1987, the USSR launched the largest
 civilian Earth observation platform ever put into orbit, similar to the Earth
 Observing System that the U.S. hopes to launch in 1995. The Soviet satellite
 weighs between fifteen and twenty tons, is the size of a schoolbus, and
 probably includes an advanced imaging radar.36
 OTHER PARTICIPANTS
 Other countries and third parties are developing satellite reconnaissance
 capabilities.
 CHINA. Information on the Chinese program is sketchy. There are no
 indications to date that China intends to enter the commercial remote-sensing
 market, but China has an obvious incentive to gather as much information
 on the Soviet Union as possible. China began launching photo-reconnais-
 sance satellites in 1975, and as of mid-1986 had launched seven low-altitude
 imaging satellites of the capsule-recovery type.37 These apparently are used
 for both military reconnaissance and natural resources missions.8 The
 Chinese capability is relatively primitive-according to one report, so prim-
 itive that the United States helps out by providing China with satellite map
 photos of the USSR. Nonetheless, China plans to launch soon a polar recon-
 naissance satellite with a resolution of 1.1 kilometers, and is working on a
 relatively sophisticated high-resolution electro-optical system that is expected
 to be launched in 1988.39 China also reportedly plans to launch a radar
 satellite to keep a better eye on its neighbor to the north. It may obtain better
 surveillance hardware through collaboration with European companies. For
 example, China and France have reportedly discussed a joint Earth-imaging
 system that would have thirty-meter pixel resolution in the visible and near-
 infrared bands.40
 JAPAN. Japan also moved into the remote-sensing field with the February
 1987 launch of its Marine Observation Satellite (MOS-1), carrying multi-
 spectral, microwave, thermal infrared, and visible sensors with spatial reso-
 36. Craig Covault, "Soviets Launch Massive Earth Survey Platform," Aviation Week and Space
 Technology, August 3, 1987, p. 27.
 37. Jim Bussart, "Surveillance satellites: Analyzing growing capabilities of Soviets, Chinese,"
 Defense Science and Electronics, July 1986, p. 43.
 38. Nicholas Johnson, The Soviet Year in Space 1984 (Colorado Springs, Colo.: Teledyne Brown
 Engineering, 1984), p. 74.
 39. Bussart, "Surveillance satellites,' p. 43.
 40. Ibid.
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 lution ranging from fifty meters to several kilometers.41 Japan's Earth Remote
 Sensing Satellite (JERS-1) is scheduled for launch in 1991. Although the
 characteristics of its sensors are still being debated, they will probably include
 a multi-spectral scanner with 25-meter resolution and a synthetic aperture
 radar with 18-meter resolution.42
 EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY. Two particularly significant radar systems are
 planned: In 1989, the European Space Agency (ESA) expects to begin launch-
 ing its own series of earth remote-sensing satellites (ERS) that include radar
 with 30-meter resolution.43 Although intended largely for oceanographic pur-
 poses, this system will provide Western Europe with significant capabilities
 for monitoring cloudy Eastern Europe, as well as such important waters as
 the Mediterranean and the Baltic and North Seas.
 CANADA. Canada is well along in plans to launch a Radarsat in 1993 with
 a resolution of thirty meters.44 Canada has strong incentives, both civilian
 and military, to develop a radar capability, as radar is particularly useful for
 observing ice-covered areas. As a recent defense policy paper states:
 Space-based systems offer the promise of far more effective surveillance of
 activity on land and on the surface of the sea. Although technologically more
 challenging, these systems will, in time, replace the ground-based radars of
 the North Warning System to provide a detection capability adequate against
 the bomber and cruise missile forces of the future. Only space-based sur-
 veillance has the potential for complete coverage of Canadian territory and
 adjoining air and sea space.45
 The policy paper stresses the importance of devoting major resources to a
 space-based Canadian radar system, in cooperation with the United States if
 possible, but on a national basis if need be.
 INDIA. India has for many years been striving to develop a broad-based
 space capability, launching its own rockets as early as 1963 and constructing
 its own remote-sensing satellites for over a decade. The next-generation
 41. Aviation Week and Space Technology, July 28, 1986, p. 43.
 42. Testimony of Warren Nichols before the U.S. Congress, Subcommittee on Natural Resources,
 Agriculture, Research, and the Environment, and the Subcommittee on International Scientific
 Cooperation, House Committee on Science, Space and Technology, March 31, 1987, p. 121.
 43. European Space Agency, "Announcement of Opportunity for ERS-1: Technical Annex-
 ERS-1 System Description," May 1986.
 44. Address by the Hon. Robert E.J. Layton, Minister of State (Mines) at the Announcement of
 the Interim Canadian Space Program, National Press Theatre, Ottawa, Ontario, March 20, 1985.
 45. Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Government Pub-
 lishing Centre, 1987), pp. 58-59.
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 Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) satellite will be launched in March 1988 on a
 Soviet Proton booster. The IRS series will have one multi-spectral sensor with
 72-meter resolution and two with 36-meter resolution.46 India has great need
 for the contribution that remote-sensing data can make to its development
 program, but also faces security threats from Pakistan that provide a strong
 incentive to acquire a surveillance capability, and a strong and well-demon-
 strated desire to prove to the world that India can match the technological
 achievements of even the most advanced powers.
 NEWS MEDIA. The idea of a satellite owned and operated by the media has
 been widely discussed, since they are in the information-gathering business,
 and television networks could afford the few hundred million dollars re-
 quired to acquire and launch a typical remote-sensing satellite. But the media
 would need a number of highly maneuverable satellites to provide quick
 coverage of breaking events, as well as spatial resolution on the order of five
 meters or better-both expensive propositions. Moreover, the television net-
 works currently lack both the facilities and the in-house expertise to process
 and interpret the satellite data.47 The media have already been tripped up by
 their own misinterpretation, reporting that two reactors had melted down at
 Chernobyl, although in fact only one was involved in the disaster. Television
 news reporters relied on satellite imagery from Eosat and were apparently
 misled by a second "hot spot" at the scene that was actually a reflection, not
 a reactor.48 It is more likely that the media will continue to rely for some time
 on imagery available from Eosat, SPOT, and Soyuzkharta, and the expected
 capabilities from Japan, Canada, and the European Space Agency. If the costs
 of building, launching, and operating an imaging satellite come down, how-
 ever, it is very likely that a media company or consortium will opt for such
 a system.
 A substantial impetus to the widespread use of satellite remotely-sensed
 data may be the proposed Global Change program, an internationally-coor-
 dinated research program to study the extensive and yet little understood
 effects of human activities on the delicately-balanced global environment.
 Proposals for such a program have been put forward by NASA, the National
 Academy of Sciences, and the International Council of Scientific Unions. In
 46. Jasani and Sakata, Satellites for Arms Control, p. 35; also see chart, ibid., pp. 70-71.
 47. For a detailed analysis of some of the difficulties facing potential media users of space, see
 OTA, Commercial Newsgathering From Space.
 48. Dino A. Brugioni, "Satellite Images on TV: The Camera Can Lie," Washington Post, December
 15, 1986, p. Hi.
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 a recent report, the Earth System Sciences Committee of the NASA Advisory
 Council stressed the need for additional space-based satellites and sensors
 to study the oceans, atmosphere, and land areas of Earth.49 If this global
 program is adopted-and the growing international concern over the envi-
 ronment makes this likely-it will require an unprecedentedly extensive
 exchange of data gleaned from both space-based and ground-based obser-
 vations, adding to the flood of publicly available information.
 GROUND RECEIVING STATIONS. In addition, there is the crucial issue of who
 has the capability to receive and interpret satellite data. Civilian operators
 are actively trying to sell the imagery; countries in all parts of the world have
 ground stations to receive the data directly (see Table 2); and a new industry
 for data interpretation appears to be emerging. Eastman Kodak has invested
 $10 million to create an image processing center in the Washington, D.C.,
 area.50 There thus appears little room for doubt that both images and inter-
 pretation skills are becoming increasingly available.
 CONSTRAINTS ON NEW SYSTEMS
 Although the emergence of a large number of new remote-sensing satellites
 does mean that new information will be widely available, there are limits on
 the uses to which this capability will be put. It is unlikely that most of the
 new third-party operators of satellite imaging systems will develop the very
 sophisticated reconnaissance capabilities of the superpowers, which can de-
 tect objects measured in inches. Most countries do not face the compelling
 necessity that has driven the United States to push this technology toward
 its very expensive limits. The U.S. has faced an unusual situation-an op-
 ponent whose geography allows it to hide its most sensitive military secrets
 far behind its borders, whose closed society restricts access to information
 by other means, and whose technology enables it to threaten others from
 deep within its territory and to shoot down most airborne imaging plat-
 49. Earth System Sciences Committee, NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration)
 Advisory Council, Earth System Science Overview: A Program For Global Change (Washington, D.C.:
 NASA, May 1986). In particular, the report notes that the Earth Observing System, presently
 under consideration by NASA, will be needed. This system will have three classes of instru-
 ments: 1) a group of instruments that takes images of the Earth's surface in the visible, infrared,
 and microwave ranges and sounds the lower atmosphere; 2) a complement of radar instruments
 that will gather information on the character and structure of the surface; and 3) a group of
 instruments designed to study the composition and dynamics of the atmosphere and to measure
 the Earth's energy balance.
 50. "Kodak gives remote sensing a boost," Space Business News, March 9, 1987, p. 4.
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 Table 2. Current (and Planned) Ground Stations
 Europe/ North South
 Africa Australasia Middle East America America
 Landsat South Australia, Italy, Canada, Brazil
 Africa India, PRC, Norway, U.S. (Ecuador)
 Thailand, Sweden
 (New Saudi Arabia
 Zealand)
 SPOT Japan Italy, Canada
 Sweden
 Sources: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Commercial Newsgathering
 From Space-A Technical Memorandum, OTA-TM-ISC-40 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O.,
 May 1987); Testimony of Peter M.P. Norris before the U.S. Congress, Subcommittee on
 Natural Resources, Agriculture Research, and the Environment, and the Subcommittee on
 International Scientific Cooperation, House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
 March 31, 1987.
 As this table indicates, many countries have direct access to satellite imagery. In addition
 to ground stations, substantial efforts have been made by the United States and other space
 powers to provide training to developing countries in the interpretation of remote sensing
 data for civilian purposes. See, for example, the Proceedings of the United Nations Inter-
 national Meeting of Experts on Remote Sensing Information Systems, Hosted and Co-
 sponsored by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, May 7-11, 1984.
 forms.51 This compelling threat to its national security made the United States
 willing to spend the tens of billions of dollars necessary for sophisticated
 military reconnaissance from space.
 Even those countries that have advanced imaging satellites may not wish
 to use them for detailed military reconnaissance. Lowering the orbits of
 civilian satellites would greatly increase the amount of detail they could
 reveal, but would narrow the scope of their vision, thus dramatically reducing
 the economic value of the images for civilian purposes, and would also
 shorten their operating lives. Low orbits are dangerous to a satellite's health.
 For example, the Central Intelligence Agency's KH-6 spy satellites took ex-
 cellent photos from an average perigee (low point of orbit) of 150 kilometers
 (93.2 miles), but lasted only about five days each because of the heat of
 atmospheric friction at that altitude.52 Adding the fuel needed to make sat-
 51. U.S. spy planes have occasionally been shot down by the Soviets, and U.S. crews have
 been killed or taken prisoner. See James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace: A Report on NSA, America's
 Most Secret Agency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), pp. 178-186.
 52. Burrows, Deep Black, p. 214.
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 ellites maneuverable, and thus able to dip in and out of the atmosphere,
 would also make them heavier and thus much more costly to launch. More-
 over, maneuvering is a risky business that can disable a satellite.
 In addition, for many military purposes satellites must not only cover their
 targets in detail, they must cover them frequently. The data then must be
 analyzed by experts who know military systems and can evaluate what they
 see, and who have access to high-speed computers that can manipulate the
 imagery to reveal more information. These requirements add up to a great
 deal of money. The cost of operating a reasonably sophisicated reconnais-
 sance system and analyzing the vast amounts of detailed information that
 come in from reconnaissance satellites would overwhelm most national econ-
 omies. The value of the U.S. technical intelligence system has been estimated
 at more than $100 billion.53
 There are sometimes other and cheaper ways of gathering the information
 that satellites provide. Alternative sources of information include airborne
 imaging cameras, which are adequate for many military purposes. For ex-
 ample, long-range oblique photography (LOROP) can distinguish vehicles
 while remaining beyond the range of surface-to-air missiles. Israel, Saudi
 Arabia, Turkey, and Greece all use airborne systems as a relatively inexpen-
 sive alternative to costly satellite systems, and technical improvements are
 occurring rapidly.54
 Yet despite these constraints and the availability of some alternatives,
 several countries (France, China, and possibly Canada) are pushing ahead
 with military satellite programs; even the data available from purely civilian
 satellites can reveal information important to national security. Moreover, a
 variety of new technologies coming into play, such as merging different types
 of imagery or combining the information with data available from other
 sources, will enhance the usefulness of satellite data. ABC News, for example,
 combined satellite imagery with terrain data to provide the views of Calgary
 for the 1988 Winter Olympics; it used satellite imagery to confirm that Iran
 was building Silkworm missile pads on Abu Musa Island inside the Persian
 Gulf, in a report broadcast on the May 20, 1988, ABC Evening News. The
 53. Ibid, p. 154. However, this estimate includes the entire technical intelligence (TECHINT)
 system, including electronic eavesdropping. No separate figures are available for the cost of just
 the reconnaissance satellite activities.
 54. "Countries Adopt Airborne Cameras As Alternatives to Satellite Systems," Aviation Week
 and Space Technology, September 7, 1987.
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 combination of technological advances and commercial competition promises
 to drive down the cost of acquiring and using satellite imagery.
 Security Issues
 It is clear that the emerging remote-sensing satellite systems can provide
 militarily significant information concerning roads, harbor facilities, ship de-
 ployments, and the like. Such information is already widely available to
 anyone willing to pay, and will become more significant over the next decade,
 as new and more capable systems begin to distribute imagery. Analyses such
 as the one carried out by NUPI demonstrate the usefulness of these data in
 corroborating information in the open literature and in discovering new data
 not yet publicly known. Moreover, although the superpowers have an array
 of reconnaissance satellites in orbit, and the Soviets, at least, can launch more
 as needed, the two countries cannot and do not observe in detail all parts of
 the globe at all times. The more eyes in the sky, the more likely it becomes
 that someone will notice any given activity, and the more difficult it becomes
 to exploit gaps in coverage to carry out sensitive activities. If resolution of
 five meters or better does become the new standard for publicly-available
 imagery, then analysts and anyone else willing to pay will have access to
 imagery good enough to see aircraft, identify large ships, and detect a variety
 of military maneuvers and operations. This information will affect U.S. for-
 eign relations with its allies, the handling of crises, and the military options
 available in a wide variety of situations.
 EFFECTS ON NATIONAL SECURITY IN PEACETIME
 On the most general level, the proliferation of eyes in the sky could be a
 stabilizing force in international relations, much as it has been between the
 superpowers. Reconnaissance can help by calming overblown fears, as the
 early Discoverer satellites did by exploding the "missile gap" fallacy. Satellites
 could thus help to reduce tensions by reducing fears of surprise attack. In
 such areas as nuclear non-proliferation, the new capabilities could encourage
 monitoring between countries; this would both increase confidence and re-
 duce the temptation to try to carry out a secret weapons program whose
 existence could easily be shown to the world.
 But this diffusion of knowledge is not an unmitigated good for the United
 States. The acquisition of these capabilities may widen the already-growing
 distance between the United States and its NATO allies. Many Europeans
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 are increasingly eager to reduce Europe's dependence on America, an atti-
 tude bolstered of late by the apparent U.S. willingness to overlook European
 security concerns at Reykjavik and to begin to fold the nuclear umbrella by
 withdrawing short-range and intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) from
 Europe. Europe is equally concerned with restoring its economic competi-
 tiveness with the United States and Japan; this will require attention to high
 technology. The 1985 creation of the European Research Coordination
 Agency ("Eureka"), which now boasts 19 member countries, came about
 partly as a response to the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), but more
 importantly as part of a long-standing recognition of the need for European
 cooperation in order to compete with the United States and Japan.55 Similarly,
 France is using its remote sensing capabilities both to move into the market
 for remote-sensing imagery and to develop a military capability. These two
 concerns-security and competitiveness-may drive Western Europe as a
 whole, like France, further towards both an independent military reconnais-
 sance capability and development of commercial remote-sensing.
 Western Europe has the means and, increasingly, the will to establish an
 independent capacity for arms control verification. European nations could,
 for example, independently verify measures like those agreed to in the Stock-
 holm Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), which entered into force
 in January 1987. This agreement requires advance notification for movements
 of at least 13,000 troops or 300 battle tanks, or for maneuvers involving more
 than 200 aircraft sorties, 3000 troops in parachute drops, or amphibious
 landings.56 Given that a ground resolution of 2.5 meters is adequate to
 distinguish tanks from armored personnel carriers and to differentiate various
 types of planes, and that regularly-spaced marching units can be seen with
 a resolution of 3.5 meters,57 the SPOT and Helios sensors will be quite
 adequate to pick up any unusual activity that would justify a challenge
 inspection, as permitted by the treaty. With the verification capabilities that
 are becoming available to Europe, the NAI'O allies will no longer need to
 depend on U.S. technical means to assure compliance with such agreements.
 Similarly, even the current generation of SPOT sensors provided sufficient
 55. Pierre-Henri Laurent, "Eureka or the Technological Renaissance of Europe," Washington
 Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Winter 1987), pp. 55-66.
 56. Sverre Lodggaard, "The Stockholm CSBMs and the Future of the CDE," Arms Control, Vol.
 8, No. 2 (September 1987), pp. 157-160.
 57. Torleiv Orhaug, "Technology requirements for a satellite monitoring agency focused on
 Europe," in Jasani and Sakata, Satellites for Arms Control, p. 91.
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 information on the Krasnoyarsk radar to enable ABC Evening News to broad-
 cast a report that showed images of the radar, concluding that it was defi-
 nitely a violation of the ABM Treaty.58
 The growing European capabilities will improve the allies' ability to assess
 independently the threat posed by Soviet military capabilities. Differing
 threat assessments already complicate intra-alliance discussions, and the al-
 lies have not always been convinced by U.S. accusations of Soviet noncom-
 pliance with arms control agreements. With a strengthened European recon-
 naissance capability, and with increased public access to satellite data,
 cheating on arms control treaties and deception of public opinion about the
 compliance record will both become more difficult. There is considerable
 evidence that the Soviets rarely resort to outright cheating on formal arms
 control agreements, although they often strain the limits and frustrate U.S.
 expectations. The allies generally do not share U.S. outrage over the Soviet
 failure to abide by U.S. expectations of how the Soviets should behave.
 Assessments will be complicated by the fact that deliberate deception is a
 tactic regularly practiced by both superpowers when they know satellites are
 overhead. Thus, the new European capabilities may well exacerbate existing
 divisions within the alliance.
 It is quite possible that a number of West European nations, and possibly
 other states as well, will band together to share satellite technology and
 derived information. Recent years have seen a spate of proposals for inter-
 national satellite monitoring and verification mechanisms. Increasingly those
 proposals call for the establishment of a regional European agency, possibly
 as a first step toward an international agency. France was the first to propose
 the creation of an international satellite monitoring agency (ISMA), with two
 functions: to monitor compliance with arms control agreements, and to keep
 a close eye on global trouble spots and provide early warning of impending
 crises.59 Although a group of experts appointed by the U.N. Secretary Gen-
 eral (at the request of the General Assembly) concluded in 1981 that an ISMA
 was technically, legally and financially feasible,60 the ISMA idea quickly died
 a political death. In a U.N. vote in December 1982, the United States and
 the Soviet Union, then the only operators of satellite systems with the req-
 58. ABC Evening News, April 2, 1987.
 59. France made the proposal in spring 1978 at the United Nations' First Special Session on
 Disarmament.
 60. United Nations, "The Implications of Establishing an International Satellite Monitoring
 Agency," Disarmament Study Series No. 9, A/AC.206/14 (New York: United Nations, 1983).
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 uisite capabilities, made clear their opposition to the idea. The resolution was
 adopted with 126 votes in favor, nine against (including the Soviet Union
 and several bloc members), and ten abstentions (including the United States
 as well as several Soviet-bloc members). The United States based its objection
 on the ground that an international agency would not necessarily evaluate
 such information objectively or disseminate information with appropriate
 attention to legitimate national security concerns.
 The superpowers do not have the final word, however. The French SPOT
 and Helios programs could clearly serve as the basis for a regional, if not a
 global, satellite monitoring agency. Although some French officials have
 reportedly questioned the desirability of sharing these intelligence-gathering
 capabilities too broadly, even with fellow Europeans, France has in fact made
 serious efforts to involve Germany, Italy, and Spain in the Helios program,
 and other European countries own small shares of SPOT. Moreover, ESA's
 ERS-1 will provide additional monitoring capabilities. Although ESA's charter
 mandates that it restrict itself to peaceful activities, arms control verification
 and other reconnaissance activities could quite plausibly be deemed to com-
 ply with the restriction.
 Canada's Department of External Affairs has put forward a proposal for
 "Paxsats" to be developed by countries other than the superpowers, for
 verification of multilateral arms control agreements. These satellites would
 draw on the technology developed for the civilian Canadian Radarsat and
 its follow-ons to achieve seven-meter all-weather imagery. This would be
 good enough to detect tank movements and thus useful for verification of
 agreements like the 1987 Stockholm CDE ban on unannounced troop move-
 ments. By the late 1990s, the resolution of Paxsat imagery could be as good
 as one meter. The proposal takes into account superpower objections to
 ISMA. Paxsats would be used only to verify multilateral agreements, not
 superpower bilateral accords, and the data would be available to all parties.
 The policies on control of the satellites and dissemination of their data would
 be negotiated as part of each treaty to be so verified. Nontetheless, although
 the French and West Germans have expressed interest in the proposal, the
 superpowers to date have not.61
 61. "PAXSAT Concept: The Application of Space-Based Remote Sensing for Arms Control
 Verification," Verification Brochure No. 2 (Ottawa: Canadian Department of External Affairs,
 undated), p. 44; "Canada studies 'Paxsats' for arms control," Military Space, August 31, 1987,
 pp. 1-3. For details on the current status of Radarsat and other Canadian civilian space activities,
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Wed, 08 Mar 2017 09:51:27 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 International Security 13:2 1 116
 Some neutral nations have also considered the role they might play. In
 1985, a Swiss official proposed that the European neutrals-Austria, Finland,
 Sweden, and Switzerland-could use their own satellites to verify arms
 control treaties.62 That same year, the Swedish Minister of Energy, speaking
 on behalf of her government, found "interesting and well worth studying"
 a proposal that "a number of neutral and non-aligned nations together with
 other countries with a well developed space technology should take the
 initiative to launch an independent satellite arms control observation sys-
 tem. "63
 The NATO allies and other European countries may seek an independent
 satellite reconnaissance capability both to obtain status and independent
 information, and because of concerns over the reliability of the U.S. as a
 partner and as a source of information. Much of the same reasoning can be
 applied to Japan. Strains over trade issues with the United States raise the
 question whether Japan can rely forever on the United States for its own
 security; Japan, which may feel threatened by the growing Soviet presence
 in Asia and the Pacific, has reportedly considered the possibility of acquiring
 reconnaissance capabilities.
 Other countries with space technology have an equally strong interest in
 seeing what the military forces of their neighbors are up to, particularly in
 this era of increasingly widespread sophisticated weaponry. For example,
 India may want to gather information on Pakistani nuclear facilities. A res-
 olution of about three to five meters would be adequate to detect preparations
 for a test of a nuclear weaponfr4
 In the short run, the acquisition of satellite remote-sensing technology
 (mostly by U.S. allies) will impose some adjustment costs as the United
 States loses its monopoly on this source of information. But the United States
 has begun to insist that its allies should do more in their own defense, and
 their increased capabilities will necessarily bring about greater independence.
 In the long run, these capabilities will help Western Europe to become the
 stronger "second pillar" of the alliance the United States claims to want. In
 see Chris Bullock, "Canada in Space," Space Markets and Satellite Technology (Interavia), Spring
 1987, pp. 11-22.
 62. Edouard Brunner, quoted in Jasani and Sakata, Satellites for Arms Control, p. 38.
 63. Brigitta Dahl, Opening Address of SIPRI Conference on Space Weapons and International
 Security, July 1985, reproduced in Bhupendra Jasani, ed., Space Weapons and International Security
 (New York: Oxford University Press and SIPRI, 1987), pp. 349-351.
 64. United Nations, "Implications of Establishing an International Satellite Monitoring Agency."
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 other regions, particularly volatile ones such as South Asia, satellite data
 may help to dispel unwarranted fears, as has often been the case in the
 superpower relationship.
 CRISIS AND WAR
 In times of crisis, the tempo of decision-making is speeded up. Often a
 desperate effort is made to buy time to review options and decide what to
 do. Thus, the crucial factor becomes the timeliness of the data that is available
 to the public and to other governments. For this reason, the electro-optical
 systems used by Eosat and SPOT are far more significant than the availability
 of the high-resolution Soviet photography.
 In the most studied crisis of the nuclear era, the Cuban missile crisis, only
 the United States knew that the Soviets had placed missiles in Cuba, until
 the U.S. chose to reveal this information. The crisis began on October 15,
 1962, when U-2 aerial photographs taken the day before showed SS-4 and
 SS-5 missiles in Cuba. The Soviet deployment was not made public until a
 televised presidential address on October 22.65 During the intervening week,
 the president's Executive Committee had the time to consider U.S. options
 and to choose to handle the crisis by means of a blockade.
 Yet today, civilian satellites might be able to discover the missile sites as
 quickly as the government could. SS-4 missiles at about twenty meters, and
 SS-5s at around 25 meters long, are visible to civilian satellites.66 The rapid
 spread of information will make it harder to withhold sensitive data from
 the public and other governments, even for short periods of time. This loss
 of flexibility could be a serious problem in times of crisis, leading to situations
 in which world leaders might be pressured into precipitous action by their
 publics or by other governments.
 The spread of monitoring capabilities may impose restrictions on a presi-
 dent's ability to prepare for military action in secret. For example, although
 it is unlikely that satellites operated by the news media would be sure of
 detecting fast-breaking events such as the Grenada invasion, they might
 stumble across such events, and could also be used to confirm collateral
 information. The media, in the United States or in other countries, could
 65. David A. Welch and James G. Blight, "The Eleventh Hour of the Cuban Missile Crisis: An
 Introduction to the ExComm Transcripts," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Winter 1987/88),
 p. 7.
 66. Barton Wright, World Weapon Database, Vol. 1, Soviet Missiles (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington
 Books and the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, 1986), pp. 313, 321.
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Wed, 08 Mar 2017 09:51:27 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 International Security 13:2 1 118
 easily blow the whistle on covert U.S. operations. As the number of satellites
 increases, along with the ability to build systems that can look obliquely as
 well as straight down, it will be ever harder to be sure of being unobserved
 while preparing for such operations.
 For the next decade or so, third-party satellite capabilities will have little
 effect on U.S. plans for fighting a war with the Soviet Union. The Soviet
 reconnaissance capability is already extensive, and a great deal of information
 on U.S. facilities and tactics is already public knowledge. The most significant
 impact will be on other countries' wars, where the adversaries are not ac-
 customed to have satellite information available and do not have counter-
 measures or good deceptive tactics available. Landsat imagery has already
 been used to show Iraqi fortifications around Basra, information that would
 presumably be useful to Iranians planning an attack.67
 U.S. Options
 The U.S. has three options to deal with the expansion of third-party satellite
 capability: to promote the free flow of information; to attempt to negotiate
 agreed restraints; or to take direct countermeasures against satellites or their
 data-gathering. Of these, some combination of the first and third, with
 emphasis on the first, is most likely to serve long-term U.S. needs.
 The United States could accept and even welcome the greater global trans-
 parency that the proliferation of satellites will bring. In terms of the super-
 power rivalry, the proliferation would work to U.S. advantage. Given the
 openness of U.S. society and the closed nature of the Soviet Union, the rest
 of the world already has a considerable amount of information about the
 United States, including U.S. military forces. The Soviet Union, by contrast,
 has found it relatively easy to escape censure for its enormous military build-
 up. With the growing number of eyes in the sky, and the ready availability
 of the data to the media and thus to the public, the international community
 may add far more to its knowledge about the Soviet Union than about the
 United States.
 The United States could reverse its opposition to participation in an Inter-
 national Satellite Monitoring Agency, in order to exert influence over the
 analysis and dissemination of information. Indeed, if it remains opposed, it
 67. Jasani and Sakata, Satellites for Arms Control, p. 20.
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 risks being left out of a movement that is attracting increasing worldwide
 approval. The latest Soviet "Star Peace" proposal at the United Nations hints
 at even Soviet acceptance of an ISMA in the long run:
 The WSO's [World Space Organization's] efforts would be directed towards
 peaceful exploration of outer space and control over observance of agree-
 ments on preventing the spread of the arms race to it as they are concluded.
 To exercise such a control, it would initially use technical facilities granted
 by powers and later-its own facilities.68
 In a similar vein, the United States might promote the establishment of an
 international joint venture to carry out remote sensing for natural resource
 purposes. A model would be the International Telecommunications Satellite
 Organization (Intelsat), which for twenty-four years has provided a global
 commercial communications satellite system. Given the current difficulties
 of the U.S. Landsat/Eosat program, an international organization might be
 the best way to assure continued U.S. access to the fruits of the technology
 it pioneered.
 AGREED RESTRAINTS
 Until recently, U.S. policy was to impose restrictions on the resolution that
 civilian satellites could achieve, a logical policy when the only civilian satellite
 system was operated by the U.S. government. At the same time, the U.S.
 carried out extensive and successful efforts to establish the legitimacy of
 satellite military reconnaissance, and the economic usefulness of civilian
 remote sensing. As a result, there appear to be few legal or technical instru-
 ments for restricting the flood of information from satellites.
 As early as 1958, the United States was concerned with establishing the
 legitimacy of satellite observation of Earth from space. That summer, National
 Security Council document 58141/1, "Preliminary U.S. Policy in Outer
 Space," urged that the United States "seek urgently a political framework
 which will place the uses of U.S. reconnaissance satellites in a political and
 psychological context more favorable to the U.S. intelligence effort."69 Despite
 initial Soviet objections, which subsided in 1963 as the Soviets acquired their
 own satellite reconnaissance capabilities, the U.S. position has been tacitly
 accepted by the international community. In the Outer Space Treaty of 1967,
 68. Soviet "Star Peace" Message to the United Nations, delivered by Nikolay Ryzhkov, Chair-
 man of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, June 1986.
 69. Burrows, Deep Black, p. 105.
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 the United Nations legally codified the notion that outer space cannot be
 claimed as national territory, legitimating satellite travel in space over any
 country's territory.
 The United States has also gone to some lengths to make the idea of the
 broad dissemination of civilian remote-sensing data acceptable. From the first
 launch in 1972, Landsat satellites have returned data without first obtaining
 the permission of the countries overflown, and the United States has made
 those data available to all buyers at the same time and price. Over the years,
 some Soviet bloc and Third World countries argued that they should have a
 right of prior consent, to review and possibly withhold any data about their
 territory, since such data contain information of economic and national se-
 curity value. In December 1986, however, the legal principles on dissemi-
 nation of data gathered from civilian satellites adopted by the United Nations
 General Assembly made no mention on any right of prior consent, in a
 clearcut victory for the U.S. position.70
 Given this history, it is not surprising that longstanding U.S. efforts to
 impose restrictions on the resolution that civilian satellites can attain have
 come to naught, thanks to the French and the Soviets. The Soviets are already
 selling imagery at five meters. The Reagan administration has seen the hand-
 writing on the wall, and, in an effort to remain economically competitive in
 remote sensing, has now removed all limits on the resolution that U.S.
 civilian satellites can achieve.
 COUNTERMEASURES
 Since satellite orbits are fixed, the United States can know when an obser-
 vation satellite will be overhead and can take countermeasures.71 These can
 be very simple: for example, driving one truck around so that extensive tire
 tracks might fool an observer into thinking that substantial military assets
 were deployed, when in fact most of the trucks are hidden elsewhere. Coun-
 termeasures can also be quite sophisticated: the Soviets routinely deploy
 large numbers of fake tanks and even ships. As discussed in the section on
 radar, fixed assets can be covered with conductive material such as chicken-
 70. United Nations General Assembly Resolution, "Principles relating to remote sensing of the
 Earth from Space."
 71. See U.S. Congress, Office of Techn'ology Assessment, Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures,
 and Arm Control, OTA-ISC-281 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O. September 1985), p. 4.
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 wire screening to create a reflective glare through which no details can be
 discerned.
 There are many ways other than shooting them down to put satellites out
 of commission, especially unprotected civilian systems that are of necessity
 in low Earth orbit.72 Electronic and electro-optical countermeasures can be
 used to jam or deceive a satellite. Satellites can be spoofed-interfered with
 electronically and made to shut down or change orbit. The operator may
 never know whether the malfunction is merely a technical glitch or is the
 result of a hostile action. (Similarly, the spoofer may never know whether
 the target satellite was successfully affected.) For example, there have been
 unconfirmed reports that in the late 1970s the Soviets blinded the U.S. civilian
 Seasat radar satellite, which failed after only 99 days.
 As the capabilities of Soviet satellites increase, and particularly as they
 acquire the ability to do real-time targeting, the United States will have a
 strong incentive to develop electronic countermeasures. For example, it may
 be possible by the early 1990s to use lasers to damage optics or electronic
 componentry, a tactic described by one group of experts as "plausibly deni-
 able and hard to confirm."73 Such measures might work against civilian or
 third-party reconnaissance satellites during a crisis, but would be likely to
 lead to vigorous international protests if carried out on a regular basis in
 peacetime, when patterns of satellite dysfunction would be obvious.
 Perhaps the most obvious and direct response to unwanted observation
 would be to shoot down any satellite that threatened to reveal sensitive
 information. Both superpowers have inadvertent but inherent ASAT (anti-
 satellite) capabilities in their intercontinental and submarine-launched ballis-
 tic missiles, a capability that is spreading as more and more nations develop
 space launch vehicles. Moreover, highly maneuverable spacecraft such as the
 Space Shuttle could serve as de facto ASAT weapons. Both superpowers have
 tested specific ASAT weapons, and will have many more such capabilities if
 ballistic missile defense interceptors are developed and deployed.74 In addi-
 72. See Michael M. May, "Safeguarding our Military Space Systems," Science, Vol. 232 (April
 18, 1986), pp. 336-340.
 73. William J. Perry, Brent Scowcroft, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and James A. Schear, "Anti-Satellite
 Weapons and U.S. Military Space Policy," in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and James A. Schear, eds.,
 Seeking Stability in Space: Anti-Satellite Weapons and the Evolving Space Regime (Lanham, Md.: The
 Aspen Strategy Group and University Press of America, 1987), p. 11.
 74. Although the United States claims that the Soviet ASAT system is operational, it is a primitive
 and limited system, and the current U.S. ASAT has been tested only once, albeit successfully.
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 tion, the ground facilities that control the satellites and receive their data are
 generally highly vulnerable to attack.
 Yet short of a situation of imminent or actual war, it is hard to imagine
 actual execution of such military countermeasures. The superpowers are each
 the other's worst enemy, yet they have learned to live with each other's
 surveillance. It would be foolhardy for the United States to bring down
 international opprobrium on itself by destroying civilian satellites in any
 situation short of imminent war. And in wartime, the operators with the
 greatest satellite capabilities (other than the Soviets) are likely to be U.S.
 allies or U.S. companies.
 Conclusion
 Satellite imagery beyond the control of the United States is already available
 to other governments and to the public. Strong incentives are now compelling
 a number of countries to develop satellite technology for military reconnais-
 sance as well as for civilian remote-sensing purposes. Although satellite
 imagery merely provides one additional source of information in an infor-
 mation-loaded world, it is information of an unusually comprehensive nature
 and of unusually vivid impact. Whether it comes from dedicated military
 reconnaissance systems such as the French Helios program, or as an inci-
 dental by-product of civilian remote-sensing, third-party satellite imagery
 will affect U.S. national security and foreign relations.
 The new transparency will have some costs for the United States. It may
 affect crisis stability by forcing governments to act precipitously on infor-
 mation that previously would not have become public. It will affect the ability
 of the United States to prepare secretly for military operations, although this
 problem can be mitigated through the judicious use of electronic counter-
 measures. It will certainly provide U.S. allies and others with an independent
 source of information, thus depriving the United States of one accustomed
 source of influence and strengthening the ability of others to act without
 reference to the capabilities and concerns of the United States.
 In general, however, the new transparency can work to U.S. advantage.
 The United States finds it difficult to keep secrets in the best of circumstances,
 and has long recognized that a careful policy of supporting the free flow of
 information pays off in the long run. From the initial insistence in the early
 1960s on the legitimacy of satellite reconnaissance, through the subsidized
 operation of the Landsat system to establish the principle of broad dissemi-
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 nation of civilian remote-sensing data, to the U.N. adoption in 1987 of legal
 principles on remote sensing that reflect U.S. rather than Soviet preferences,
 the United States has followed a consistent and well-executed policy.
 Of late, however, the United States has shown an unfortunate tendency
 to veer from this well-established path. The budget cuts that have disrupted
 Eosat's operation of the Landsat system threaten to deprive the United States
 of a significant voice in determining future global policy regarding civilian
 remote sensing: the United States will have little influence if it has no system.
 Similarly, the unthinking U.S. resistance to the proposals for an international
 or regional satellite monitoring agency reflects a general reluctance to accept
 the fact that the superpower monopoly on Earth observation satellites is
 already gone and will not return. While there are real costs to the loss of this
 monopoly, and only limited steps that can be taken to control the damage,
 these costs tend to be higher for U.S. adversaries than for the United States
 and its allies.
 The removal of restrictions on U.S. civilian satellite resolution is a welcome
 step toward ensuring that the United States remains an active player, but it
 is only a step. The United States now needs to provide much stronger support
 for its only civilian remote-sensing satellite, at the very least by fulfilling its
 legal commitment to provide subsidies for a limited time. Rather than just
 learning to live with increased surveillance, the United States should actively
 promote the greater use of satellite capabilities for civilian remote-sensing
 purposes, and should reconsider its current objections to international sat-
 ellite monitoring. Otherwise, the United States may find itself cold-shoul-
 dered by its allies, outwitted by the Soviets, and with no effective voice in
 future global development of a technology it first pioneered and promoted.
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